

Dynamics of Social Balance on Networks

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
2010 March 04

Marco Winkler


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
Definition: Social Balance




balanced



unbalanced




balanced



unbalanced

Example



Balanced?

Definition: Social Balance

*A network is balanced, if **all** of its consisting triangles are balanced.*

→ How can this be achieved?

Theorem: In a **completely connected** graph, the only balanced solution is: Two groups X and Y such that for all nodes $x_1, x_2 \in X$ and $y_1, y_2 \in Y$:


$$(x_1, x_2) = (y_1, y_2) = + 1 , \quad (x_1, y_2) = - 1$$

[4]

Definition: Social Balance


Proof:

- Pick an arbitrary node A
- Split the graph into the friends and the enemies of A



- Consider any of the open links [3]
- From trivial conclusions follows, that there are exactly two groups

Example





Balanced?

- 123, 126, 456 → yes
- 156, 125, 126 → no!
- ...


→ system will evolve

Local Triad Dynamics (LTD)




- Update rule:
 - Pick a triangle at random
 - Transforms the selected triad into a balanced one
 - repeat
- p is the control parameter of that model

Example: LTD-Update




Example: LTD-Update

Switch (2,4) from unfriendly to friendly!



Example: LTD-Update

Switch (2,4) from unfriendly to friendly!






LTD: Final States

Some results:

- All evolutions end up in a balanced state
- The following measures only depend on p :
 - The time to reach a balanced state
 - The ratio of positive links in the final state (ρ_∞)
 - The densities of triangles with 0, 1, 2 and 3 negative links (n_0, n_1, n_2, n_3)

LTD: Final States



Average time to reach balance as a function of the network size N for an initially antagonistic society ($\rho_0 = 0$) for:

(a) $p = 1/3$


(b) $p = 1/2$

(c) $p = 3/4$

$$T_N \propto \begin{cases} e^{N^2} & p < 1/2 \\ N^{4/3} & p = 1/2 \\ (2p - 1)^{-1} \ln N & p > 1/2 \end{cases}$$


[1]

LTD: Final States




The stationary densities $n_k(p)$ of triads with k unfriendly links and the density of friendly links ρ_∞ as a function of p . Simulation results for ρ_∞ for $N = 64$ (crosses) and 256 (boxes) are also shown. [1]


Example: LTD-Update



Example: LTD-Update



Example: LTD-Update



Effects of changing
(5,6) from + to - :


- Unbalanced \rightarrow bal.:
(1,5,6)
- Balanced \rightarrow unbal.:
(2,5,6), (3,5,6), (4,5,6)

Constrained Triad Dynamics (CTD)


Update rule:

- Randomly pick an edge e_{ij}
- Define:
 u_{ij} = # of unbalanced triangles e_{ij} is part of
 b_{ij} analogously
 - Flip that edge, if $u_{ij} > b_{ij}$
 - Flip with probability 50%, if $u_{ij} = b_{ij}$
 - Else, don't flip
- Repeat

Example: CTD-Update




Example: CTD-Update




- Pick (5,6)
- $u_{56} = 1, b_{56} = 3$
→ don't flip!

Example: CTD-Update




- Pick (2,3)
- $u_{23} = 3, b_{56} = 1$
→ flip!

Example: CTD-Update




- Pick (2,3)
- $u_{23} = 3, b_{56} = 1$
→ flip!

Example: CTD-Update



- Pick (1,4)
- $u_{14} = 2, b_{14} = 2$
→ toss a coin!


CTD: Final States



Asymmetry of the final state as a function of the initial friendship density ρ_0 for several network sizes.


δ : size difference between the two groups in the final state

Constrained Triad Dynamics (CTD)




- CTD-dynamics may be trapped forever in 'jammed states'
- No local move can be made according to the update rules

Real World Example




3 Emperor's league 1872-81

Real World Example




3 Emperor's league 1872-81




Triple Alliance 1882


Real World Example



3 Emperor's league 1872-81




Triple Alliance 1882




German-Russian Lapse 1890


Real World Example




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


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


French-Russian Alliance 1891-94


Real World Example




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
Triple Alliance 1882



German-Russian Lapse 1890




French-Russian Alliance 1891-94




Entente Cordiale 1904


Real World Example




3 Emperor's league 1872-81




Triple Alliance 1882




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Entente Cordiale 1904




British-Russian Alliance 1907


Project

- Generalization to neutral edges
- Introduction of an 'energy' U and a 'temperature' T on the network
- Definition of a dynamic that flips between positive, negative and neutral edges such that every state of the system is taken on with a probability corresponding to the energy of that state


Definition: Social Balance




balanced



unbalanced



balanced




unbalanced


Note:

- For balanced triangles, it is: $e_{ij} e_{jk} e_{ki} = +1$


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
balanced



unbalanced



balanced



unbalanced

Note:

- For balanced triangles, it is: $e_{ij} e_{jk} e_{ki} = +1$
- For unbalanced triangles, it is: $e_{ij} e_{jk} e_{ki} = -1$

Project

- Energy of edge e_{ij} :

$$U_{ij} = -\frac{1}{N-2} \sum_{k=1(k \neq i, j)}^N e_{jk} \cdot e_{ki}$$

- Probabilities:

$$P(e_{ij} = +1) = \frac{e^{-\frac{U_{ij}}{T}}}{e^{-\frac{U_{ij}}{T}} + e^{\frac{0}{T}} + e^{\frac{U_{ij}}{T}}}$$

$$P(e_{ij} = 0) = \frac{1}{e^{-\frac{U_{ij}}{T}} + 1 + e^{\frac{U_{ij}}{T}}}$$

$$P(e_{ij} = -1) = \frac{e^{\frac{U_{ij}}{T}}}{e^{-\frac{U_{ij}}{T}} + 1 + e^{\frac{U_{ij}}{T}}}$$

Project

Update rule:

- Pick one edge e_{ij} at a time
- Evaluate $U_{ij} = -\frac{1}{N-2} \sum_{k=1(k \neq i,j)}^N e_{jk} \cdot e_{ki}$
- Set e_{ij} according to the probabilities
- repeat

References

- [1] T. Antal, P.L. Krapivsky, S. Redner, *Dynamics of Social Balance on Networks*, Phys. Rev. E 72, 036121 (2005)
- [2] T. Antal, P.L. Krapivsky, S. Redner, *Social Balance of Networks: The Dynamics of Friendship and Enmity*, Physica D 224, pp. 130–136 (2006)
- [3] D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, *Networks, Crowds, and Markets - Reasoning About a Highly Connected World*, Cambridge University Press (2010)
- [4] F. Harary, R.Z. Norman, D. Cartwright, *Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs*, Wiley & Sons (1965)
- [5] F. Heider, *Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality*, Psychological Rev., vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 358–374 (1944)