### CS 591: Formal Methods in Security and Privacy

Approximate probabilistic relational Hoare Logic

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#### Q&A

To increase interactivity, I will ask more question to each one of you.

It is not a test, you can always answer "pass!"

#### Recording

This is a reminder that we will record the class and we will post the link on Piazza.

This is also a reminder to myself to start recording!

### From the previous classes


### An example

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
  key :=$ Uniform({0,1}n);
  cipher := msg xor key;
  return cipher
```

Learning a ciphertext does not change any a priori knowledge about the likelihood of messages.

### Probabilistic Noninterference as a Relational Property

c is probabilistically noninterferent if and only if for every  $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$ :  $\{c\}_{m_1=\mu_1}$  and  $\{c\}_{m_2=\mu_2}$  implies  $\mu_1 \sim_{low} \mu_2$ 




```
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```

How can we prove that this is noninterferent?

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
  key :=$ Uniform({0,1}n);
  cipher := msg xor key;
  return cipher
```

```
m_1 m_2 m_1 \oplus k
```


```
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 $m_2$ 


Suppose we can now chose the key for m<sub>2</sub>. What could we choose?

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


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
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
### Coupling











### Example of Our Coupling

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.2511 0.25

```
k = 10 \oplus k \oplus 00
```

00	0.25
01	0.25
10	0.25
11	0.25

	00	01	10	11
00			0.25	
01				0.25
10	0.25			
11		0.25		

### Probabilistic Relational Hoare Quadruples

(a logical formula)

#### Precondition

Program<sub>1</sub> ~ Program<sub>2</sub>

Postcondition

$$c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

Program

Program

Probabilistic Probabilistic Postcondition

### **R-Coupling**

Given two distributions  $\mu_1 \in D(A)$ , and  $\mu_2 \in D(B)$ , an R-coupling between them, for R AxB, is a joint distribution  $\mu \in D(AxB)$  such that:

- 1) the marginal distributions of μ are μ<sub>1</sub> and μ<sub>2</sub>, respectively,
- 2) the support of  $\mu$  is contained in R. That is, if  $\mu(a,b)>0$ , then  $(a,b)\in R$ .

### Example of Our Coupling

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.2511 0.25

 $m_1$   $m_2$  R (k,  $10 \oplus k \oplus 00$ )

OO 0.25 O1 0.25 10 0.25 11 0.25

	00	O1	10	11
00			0.25	
01				0.25
10	0.25			
11		0.25		

# Relational lifting of a predicate

We say that two subdistributions  $\mu_1 \subseteq D(A)$  and  $\mu_2 \subseteq D(B)$  are in the relational lifting of the relation  $R \subseteq AxB$ , denoted  $\mu_1 R * \mu_2$  if and only if there exist an R-coupling between them.

## Validity of Probabilistic Hoare quadruple

```
We say that the quadruple c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q is valid if and only if for every pair of memories m_1, m_2 such that P(m_1, m_2) we have: \{c_1\}_{m_1} = \mu_1 and \{c_2\}_{m_2} = \mu_2 implies Q^*(\mu_1, \mu_2).
```

### Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Skip

To say that this is valid we need to show that for every  $m_1$ ,  $m_2$  such that  $P(m_1, m_2)$  we need to show  $P*(unit(m_1), unit(m_2))$ .

### Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Composition

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow R \qquad \vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : R \Rightarrow S$$

 $\vdash c_1; c_1' \sim c_2; c_2' : P \Rightarrow S$ 

# How about random assignment?

# Today: Rand rule

approximate probabilistic noninterference

### Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Random Assignment

```
\vdash x_1 := \$ d_1 \sim x_2 := \$ d_2 : ??
```

#### We would like to have:

```
P(m_1, m_2)
\Rightarrow

let a = \{d_1\}_{m_1} in unit (m_1[x_1 \leftarrow a])
Q^*

let a = \{d_2\}_{m_2} in unit (m_2[x_2 \leftarrow a])
```

$$\vdash x_1 := \$ d_1 \sim x_2 := \$ d_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

What is the problem with this rule?

### Restricted Probabilistic Expressions

We consider a restricted set of expressions denoting probability distributions.

 $d::= f(d_1, ..., d_k)$ 

Where f is a distribution declaration

Some expression examples similar to the previous

```
uniform (\{0,1\}^{128}) bernoulli(.5) laplace(0,1)
```

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Notice that we don't need a memory anymore to interpret them

#### A sufficient condition for R-Coupling

Given two distributions  $\mu_1 \in D(A)$ , and  $\mu_2 \in D(B)$ , and a relation  $R \subseteq AxB$ , if there is a mapping  $h:A \rightarrow B$  such that:

- h is a bijective map between elements in supp(µ<sub>1</sub>) and supp(µ<sub>2</sub>),
- 2) for every  $a \in \text{supp}(\mu_1)$ ,  $(a,h(a)) \in \mathbb{R}$
- 3)  $Pr_{x\sim \mu 1}[x=a] = Pr_{x\sim \mu 2}[x=h(a)]$

Then, there is an R-coupling between  $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_2$ . We write  $h \triangleleft (\mu_1, \mu_2)$  in this case.

### Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Random Assignment

```
h \triangleleft (\{d_1\}, \{d_2\})

P = \forall v, v \in supp (\{d_1\})

\Rightarrow Q[v/x_1 < 1>, h(v)/x_2 < 2>]
```

 $-x_1 :=$ \$  $d_1 \sim x_2 :=$ \$  $d_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ 

```
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
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 $m_1$   $m_2$ 

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```
d_1=Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) d_2=Uniform(\{0,1\}^n)
```

Is this a good map?

$$h(k) = (m<1> \oplus k \oplus m<2>)$$

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What is the relation?

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What is the relation?

$$m<1>\oplus k<1>=m<2>\oplus k<2>$$

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$$h(k) = (m<1> \oplus k \oplus m<2>)$$

- 1) it is bijective between elements in the support of {d<sub>1</sub>} and {d<sub>2</sub>}
- 2) for every  $k \in \text{supp}(\{d_1\})$ ,  $m < 1 > \oplus k = m < 2 > \oplus (m < 1 > \oplus k \oplus m < 2 >)$
- 3)  $Pr_{x\sim\{d1\}}[x=v]=Pr_{x\sim\{d2\}}[x=v]$

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It is a good map!

```
h (k) = (m<1>⊕k⊕m<2>) \triangleleft ({d<sub>1</sub>}, {d<sub>2</sub>})

P=\forallk, k∈{0,1}<sup>n</sup>

⇒ m<1>⊕k<sub>1</sub><1>=m<2>⊕k<sub>2</sub><2>[v/k<sub>1</sub><1>, h (v) /k<sub>2</sub><2>] =

m<1>⊕k=m<2>⊕ (m<1>⊕k⊕m<2>)
```

```
\vdash k_1 := \$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) \sim k_2 := \$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) :
True \Rightarrow m < 1 > \oplus k_1 < 1 > = m < 2 > \oplus k_2 < 2 >
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```

Using the assignment rule, we can conclude.

#### Soundness

If we can derive  $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$  through the rules of the logic, then the quadruple  $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$  is valid.

### Completeness?