CS 591: Formal Methods in Security and Privacy Noninterference and Relational Hoare Logic


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From the previous classes

Information Flow Control

We want to guarantee that confidential inputs do not flow to nonconfidential outputs.



Low equivalence

Two memories m₁ and m₂ are low equivalent if and only if they coincide in the value that they assign to public variables.


In symbols: m₁ ~_{low} m₂

Noninterference


- A program prog is noninterferent if and only if, whenever we run it on two low equivalent memories m_1 and m_2 we have that:
- 1) Either both terminate or both nonterminate;
- 2) If they both terminate we obtain two low equivalent memories m_1 ' and m_2 '.

Noninterference

- In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if for every $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$:
- 1) {c}_{m1}= \perp iff {c}_{m2}= \perp
- 2) {c}_{m1}=m₁' and {c}_{m2}=m₂' implies $m_1' \sim_{low} m_2'$




Does this program satisfy noninterference?






Does this program satisfy noninterference?





Is this program secure?






Does this program satisfy noninterference?


x:private y:public if $x \mod 3 = 0$ then y:=1 else V:=0

No - an "implicit flow"

How can we prove our programs noninterferent?

Relational Property In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if for every $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$: 1) {C}m_1= \perp iff {C}m_2= \perp 2) {C}m_1=m_1' and {C}m_2=m_2' implies m_1' $\sim_{low} m_2'$





Relational Assertions $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$

of the two memories

$$c_1 \sim c_2 : x\langle 1 \rangle \leq x\langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow x\langle 1 \rangle \geq x\langle 2 \rangle$$

 $\uparrow \qquad \uparrow$
Tags describing which
memory we are referring to.

Validity of Hoare quadruple

We say that the quadruple $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ is valid if and only if for every pair of memories m_1, m_2 such that $P(m_1, m_2)$ we have: 1) $\{c_1\}_{m1} = \perp \text{ iff } \{c_2\}_{m2} = \perp$ 2) $\{c_1\}_{m1} = m_1 \text{ and } \{c_2\}_{m2} = m_2 \text{ implies}$ $Q(m_1', m_2').$

How do we check this?


Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Skip

⊢skip~skip:P⇒P

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Abort

Habort~abort:true⇒false


Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment




What is changed from last class?

Today: More Relational Hoare Logic


Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment Example



Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment Example



Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment example



Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Composition

$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow R \qquad \vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : R \Rightarrow S$

 $\vdash c_1; c_1' \sim c_2; c_2' : P \Rightarrow S$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Consequence

$P \Rightarrow S \qquad \vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : S \Rightarrow R \qquad R \Rightarrow Q$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

We can weaken P, i.e. replace it by something that is implied by P. In this case S.

We can strengthen Q, i.e. replace it by something that implies Q. In this case R.

Consequence + Assignment Example


 $x < 1 > = -y < 2 > \Rightarrow x < 1 > +1 = -(y < 2 > -1)$

 $\vdash x:=x+1 \sim y:=y-1:$ x<1>+1=-(y<2>-1) \Rightarrow x<1>=-y<2>

 $x < 1 > = -y < 2 > \Rightarrow x < 1 > = -y < 2 >$

 $\vdash x := x+1 \sim y := y-1:$ $x < 1 > = -y < 2 > \Rightarrow x < 1 > = -y < 2 >$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else



 $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2'$: $\neg e_1 < 1 > \land \neg e_2 < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1' \vdash ~ :P \Rightarrow Q if e_2 then c_2 else c_2'

Is this correct?

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else

P ⇒ ($e_1 < 1 > \Leftrightarrow e_2 < 2 >$) $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2$: $e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash c_1 ' \sim c_2 '$: $\neg e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$

if e₁ then c₁ else c₁' ⊢ ~ :P⇒Q if e₂ then c₂ else c₂'

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic While


P ⇒ ($e_1 < 1 > \Leftrightarrow e_2 < 2 >$) ⊢ $c_1 \sim c_2$: $e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow P$

while e₁ do c₁ ~ :P⇒P∧¬e₁<1> while e₂ do c₂ Invariant Rules of Relational Hoare-Logic One-sided Rules

What do we do if our two programs have different forms? There are three pairs of *one-sided* rules.


if e then c₁ else c₁' ⊢ ~ :P⇒ C2

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else — left



if e then c₁ else c₁' - ~ :P⇒Q C2

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else — right



Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment — left

⊢x:=e ~ skip: P[e<1>/x<1>] ⇒ P

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment — right

⊢skip ~ x:=e: P[e<2>/x<2>] ⇒ P

Also pair of one-sided rules for while — we'll ignore for now

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Program Equivalence Rule

 $\models P:c_1 \equiv c_2 \text{ means } \{c_1\}_m = \{c_2\}_m$ for all m such that P(m)

$$\models P:c_1' \equiv c_1 \qquad \models P:c_2' \equiv c_2$$
$$c_1' \sim c_2': P \Rightarrow Q$$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2: P \Rightarrow Q$$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Program Equivalences

- \models P : skip; c = c
- \models P : c; skip \equiv c


 \models P:(c1;c2);c3 = c1;(c2;c3)

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Combining Composition and Equivalence

We can combine the Composition and Program Equivalence Rules to split commands where we like:

$$\begin{split} \vdash c_1; c_2 \sim c_1' : P \Rightarrow R \\ \vdash c_3 \sim c_2'; c_3' : R \Rightarrow Q \\ \vdash c_1; c_2; c_3 \sim c_1'; c_2'; c_3' : P \Rightarrow Q \end{split}$$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Combining Composition and Equivalence



Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Combining Composition and Equivalence

$$\begin{split} \vdash c_1 \sim c_1': P \Rightarrow R \\ \vdash c_2 \sim skip: R \Rightarrow Q \\ \vdash c_1; c_2 \sim c_1'; skip: P \Rightarrow Q \\ \vdash c_1; c_2 \sim c_1': P \Rightarrow Q \end{split}$$

Relational Hoare Logic in EasyCrypt

- EasyCrypt's implementation of Relational Hoare Logic has much in common with its implementation of Hoare Logic.
- Look for the pRHL tactics in Section 3.4 of the EasyCrypt Reference Manual (the "p" stands for "probabilistic", but ignore that for now).

In Lab next, we'll look at some noninterference proofs in EasyCrypt