Formal Reasoning for Security and Privacy Lecture 2

> Marco Gaboardi Boston University gaboardi@bu.edu

Formal Semantics

We need to assign a formal meaning to the different components: formal semantics

Programming Language

- $x, y, z, ...$ program variables
- $e_1, e_2, ...$ expressions
- $c_1, c_2, ...$ commands

Semantics of Commands

This is defined on the structure of commands:

{abort}m = ⊥ {skip}m = m {c;c'}m = {c'}m' If {c}m = m' {c;c'}m = ⊥ If {c}m = ⊥ {x:=e}m = m[x←{e}m] {if e then ct else cf}m = {ct}m If {e}m=true {if e then ct else cf}m = {cf}m If {e}m=false {while e do c}m =supn∊Nat{whilen e do c}m whilen e do c = whilen e do c;if e then abort else skip while0 e do c = skip whilen+1 e do c = if e then (c;whilen e do c) else skip where and

Program

Postcondition (a logical formula)

Rules of Hoare Logic:

⊢skip: P⇒P ⊢x:=e : P[e/x]⇒P

⊢c;c': P⇒Q ⊢c:P⇒R ⊢c':R⇒Q ⊢c: P⇒Q P⇒S ⊢c:S⇒R R⇒Q

> ⊢if e then c1 else c2 : P⇒Q $\vdash c_1: e \land P \Rightarrow Q \vdash c_2: \neg e \land P \Rightarrow Q$

⊢while e do c : P ⇒ P ⋀ ¬e ⊢c : e ⋀ P ⇒ P

Information Flow Control And Relational Hoare Logic (RHL)

Some Examples of Security Properties

- •Access Control
- Encryption
- Malicious Behavior Detection
- Information Filtering
- •Information Flow Control

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- •Encryption
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- •Information Flow Control]

Private vs Public

We want to distinguish confidential information that need to be kept secret from nonconfidential information that can be accessed by everyone.

We assume that every variable is tagged with one either public or private.

x:public x:private

Information Flow Control

We want to guarantee that confidential information do not flow in what is considered nonconfidential.

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x:private y:public if $y \mod 3 = 0$ then $x := 1$ else $x := 0$

x:private y:public if $y \mod 3 = 0$ then $x := 1$ else $X: = \bigcap$

x:private y:public if x mod 3 = 0 then $y:=1$ else $_{\rm V}$: $=$ 0

x:private y:public $if x mod 3 = 0 then$ $y:=1$ else $_{\rm V}$: $=$ $\!0$

How can we formulate a policy that forbids flows from private to public?

Low equivalence

Two memories m₁ and m₂ are low equivalent if and only if they coincide in the value that they assign to public variables.

In symbols: $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$

Noninterference A program prog is noninterferent if and only if, whenever we run it on two low equivalent memories m₁ and m₂ we have that:

- 1) Either both terminate or both nonterminate
- 2) If they both terminate we obtain two low equivalent memories m₁' and m₂'.

Noninterference

- In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if for every $m_1 \sim_{\text{low}} m_2$:
- 1) {c}_{m1}=⊥ iff {c}_{m2}=⊥
- 2) ${c}_{m1}$ =m₁' and ${c}_{m2}$ =m₂' implies m₁' ~_{low} m₂'

$$
\begin{array}{c}\n \begin{array}{c}\n x \cdot p \text{ rule} \\
y \cdot p \text{ u} \text{ while } \text{ i} \text{ rule} \\
x \cdot = y\n \end{array}\n \end{array}
$$

Yes

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=k]

$$
\begin{array}{|c|c|}\n x : p \text{ぴate} \\
y : p \text{ublic} \\
x := y\n\end{array}
$$

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=k]

 $m^{in}_2=[x=n_2,y=k]$

$$
\begin{array}{|c|}\n x : \text{private} \\
y : \text{public} \\
x := y\n\end{array}
$$

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=k] mⁱⁿ₂=[x=n₂,y=k] $m^{out}₁=$ [x=k,y=k] m^{out}₂=[x=k,y=k]

No

$$
\begin{array}{c}\n \big| x : \text{private} \\
y : \text{publie} \\
y := x\n \end{array}
$$

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=k]

$$
\begin{array}{|l|}\n x : p \text{ぴate} \\
y : p \text{ublic} \\
y := x\n \end{array}
$$

 $m^{in}_1=[x=n_1,y=k]$ $m^{in}_2=[x=n_2,y=k]$

$$
\begin{array}{|l|}\n x : p \text{ぴate} \\
y : p \text{ublic} \\
y := x\n \end{array}
$$

 $m^{in}_1=[x=n_1,y=k]$ $m^{in}_2=[x=n_2,y=k]$ $m^{out}_{1}=[x=n_{1},y=n_{1}]$ $m^{out}_{2}=[x=n_{2},y=n_{2}]$

Yes

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=k]

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=k] mⁱⁿ₂=[x=n₂,y=k]

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=k] mⁱⁿ₂=[x=n₂,y=k] $m^{out}_{1}=[x=n_{1},y=5]$ m^{out}₂=[x=n₂,y=5]

es

$$
x: private\ny:public\nif y mod 3 = 0 then\nx:=1\nelse\nx:=0
$$

Yes

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=6]

$$
x: private\ny:public\nif y mod 3 = 0 then\nx:=1\nelse\nx:=0
$$

 m^{in} ₁=[x=n₁,y=6]

 $m^{in}_2 = [x=n_2, y=6]$

$$
x: private\ny:public\nif y mod 3 = 0 then\nx:=1\nelse\nx:=0
$$

Yes

 $m^{in}_1=[x=n_1,y=6]$ $m^{in}_2=[x=n_2,y=6]$

 $m^{out}_{1}=[x=1,y=6]$ m^{out}₂=[x=1,y=6]

$$
\begin{array}{l}\n\text{x:private} \\
\text{y:public} \\
\text{i f x mod 3 = 0 then} \\
\text{y:=1} \\
\text{else} \\
\text{y:=0}\n\end{array}
$$

 m^{in} ₁=[x=6,y=k]

$$
\begin{array}{l}\n\text{x:private} \\
\text{y:public} \\
\text{i f x mod 3 = 0 then} \\
\text{y:=1} \\
\text{else} \\
\text{y:=0} \\
\text{i=[x=6,y=k]} \\
\text{min}_{z=[x=5,y=k]}\n\end{array}
$$

 m^{in} ₁=[x=6,y=k]


```
s1:public 
s2:private 
r:private 
i:public 
proc Compare (s1:list[n] bool,s2:list[n] bool) 
i := 0;r:=0;while i<n /\rangle r=0 do
  if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then 
    r:=1
```

```
i := i + 1
```

```
s1:public 
s2:private 
r:private 
i:public 
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i := 0;r:=0;while i<n \wedge r=0 do
  if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then 
    r:=1i := i + 1
```


How can we prove our programs noninterferent?

Noninterference

- In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if for every $m_1 \sim_{\text{low}} m_2$:
- 1) {c}_{m1}=⊥ iff {c}_{m2}=⊥
- 2) ${c}_{m1}$ =m₁' and ${c}_{m2}$ =m₂' implies m₁' ~_{low} m₂'

Is this condition easy to check?

Validity of Hoare triple We say that the triple c: P⇒Q is valid if and only if for every memory m such that $P(m)$ and memory m' such that ${c}_{m}=m'$ we have Q(m').

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> Validity talks only about one memory. How can we manage two memories?

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- for every $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$:
- 1) {c}_{m1}=⊥ iff {c}_{m2}=⊥
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Relational Assertions $c_1 \sim c_2$: $P \Rightarrow$ Need to talk about variables

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 $c_1 \sim c_2 : x\langle 1 \rangle \leq x\langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow x\langle 1 \rangle \geq x\langle 2 \rangle$

Relational Assertions $c_1 \sim c_2$: $P \Rightarrow$ Need to talk about variables of the two memories $c_1 \sim c_2 : x\langle 1 \rangle \leq x\langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow x\langle 1 \rangle \geq x\langle 2 \rangle$

Tags describing which memory we are referring to. Validity of Hoare quadruple We say that the quadruple c_1 ~ c_2 : P⇒Q is valid if and only if for every pair of memories m_1 , m_2 such that $P(m_1,m_2)$ we have: 1) ${c_1}_{m1}$ =⊥ iff ${c_2}_{m2}$ =⊥ 2) ${c_1}_{m_1}=m_1'$ and ${c_2}_{m_2}=m_2'$ implies $Q(m_1', m_2')$.

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Is this easy to check?

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic **Skip**

⊢skip~skip:P⇒P
Correctness of an axiom

We say that an axiom is correct if we can prove the validity of each instance of the conclusion.

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Is this still good for RHL?

Correctness of Skip Rule

$$
\vdash s\,\texttt{kip}\, \texttt{~} s\,\texttt{kip}\, \texttt{.}\, \texttt{P}\texttt{~}\Rightarrow\texttt{P}
$$

To show this rule correct we need to show the validity of the quadruple skip~skip: P⇒P.

Correctness of Skip Rule

$$
\vdash s\,\texttt{kip}\, \texttt{~skip}\, s\,\texttt{kip}\, \texttt{.}\, \texttt{P}\texttt{~}\Rightarrow\texttt{P}
$$

To show this rule correct we need to show the validity of the quadruple $\text{skip} \neg \text{skip} \neg \text{skip} \colon \text{P} \Rightarrow \text{P}$.

For every m_1 , m_2 such that $P(m_1,m_2)$ and m_1' , m_2 ' such that $\{skip\}_{m1}=m_1'$ and $\{skip\}_{m2}=m_2'$ we need $P(m_1', m_2')$.

Correctness of Skip Rule

$$
\vdash s\,\texttt{kip}\, \texttt{~skip}\, s\,\texttt{kip}\, \texttt{.}\, \texttt{P}\texttt{~}\Rightarrow\texttt{P}
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For every m_1 , m_2 such that $P(m_1,m_2)$ and m_1' , m_2 ' such that $\{skip\}_{m1}=m_1'$ and $\{skip\}_{m2}=m_2'$ we need $P(m_1', m_2')$.

> Follow easily by our semantics: $\{skip\}_{m}=m$

⊢abort~abort:true⇒false

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For every m_1 , m_2 such that $P(m_1,m_2)$ we can show {abort}_{m1}= \perp iff {abort}_{m2}= \perp .

⊢abort~abort:true⇒false

To show this rule correct we need to show the validity of the quadruple abort~abort: $T\Rightarrow F$.

For every m_1 , m_2 such that $P(m_1,m_2)$ we can show {abort}_{m1}= \perp iff {abort}_{m2}= \perp .

> Follow easily by our semantics: {abort}m=⊥

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment

 $- x_1$:=e₁~ x_2 :=e2: $P[e_1<1>/x_1<1>/e_2<2>/x_2<2>] \Rightarrow P$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment Example

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment Example

 $x < 1$ > = $-y < 2$ >

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic **Consequence**

$$
P \Rightarrow S \qquad \vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : S \Rightarrow R \qquad R \Rightarrow Q
$$

$$
\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q
$$

We can weaken P, i.e. replace it by something that is implied by P. In this case S.

We can strengthen Q, i.e. replace it by something that implies Q. In this case R.

Consequence + Assignment Example

Consequence + Assignment Example

 $x<1>=-y<2>$ \Rightarrow $x<1>+1=- (y<2>-1)$

⊢x:=x+1 ~ y:=y-1: $x < 1 > +1 = - (y < 2 > -1) \Rightarrow x < 1 > = -y < 2 >$

 $x<1>=-y<2>$ \Rightarrow $x<1>=-y<2>$

⊢x:=x+1 ~ y:=y-1: $x<1>=-y<2>$ \Rightarrow $x<1>=-y<2>$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Composition

$$
\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow R \qquad \vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : R \Rightarrow S
$$

 \vdash C₁; C₁' ~ C₂; C₂': P⇒S

Rules of Hoare Logic If then else

 \vdash c₁~c₂:e₁<1> \land e₂<2> \land P \Rightarrow Q $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2'$:¬e1<1> \land ¬e2<2> \land P \Rightarrow 0

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1' \sim if e₂ then c₂ else c₂' ⊢ :P⇒Q

Rules of Hoare Logic If then else

 \vdash c₁~c₂:e₁<1> \land e₂<2> \land P \Rightarrow Q $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2'$:¬e $1> \land \neg e_2<2> \land P \Rightarrow Q$

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1' \sim if e₂ then c₂ else c₂' ⊢ :P⇒Q

Is this correct?

if true then skip else x:=x+1 \sim if false then x:=x+1 else skip ⊢
∴{x<1>=n}⇒
if false then y.=y+1 else skin $\{x<1>=n+1\}$

Is this a valid quadruple?

if true then skip else x:=x+1 \sim if false then x:=x+1 else skip ⊢
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Is this a valid quadruple?

Can we prove it with the rule above?

if true then skip else x:=x+1 \sim if false then x:=x+1 else skip ⊢
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Is this a valid quadruple? \parallel

Can we prove it with the rule above?

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If then else

Rules of Hoare Logic **While** while e₁ do c₁ \sim while e_2 do c_2 \vdash c₁~c₂ : e₁<1> \land P \Rightarrow P Invariant $: P \Rightarrow P \land \neg e_1 < 1$ $P \rightarrow e_1 < 1 > e_2 < 2 >$

Can we prove it?

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If then else

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1' \sim if e₂ then c₂ else c₂' \vdash c₁~c₂: e₁<1> \land P \Rightarrow O $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2'$:¬e1<1> \land P \Rightarrow O ⊢ :P⇒Q $P \rightarrow e_1 < 1 > = e_2 < 2 >$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If then else - left

if e then c_1 else c_1' \sim c_2 ⊢ :P⇒Q

Rules of Relational Hoare-Logic One-sided Rules

What do we do if our two programs have different forms? There are three pairs of *one-sided* rules.

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else — left

\vdash c₁~c₂ : e<1> \land P \Rightarrow 0 $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2$: $\neg e < 1$ > \land P \Rightarrow Q

if e then c₁ else c1' \sim c_2 ⊢ :P⇒Q
Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else — right

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment — left

⊢x:=e ~ skip: $P[e<1>/x<1>] \rightarrow P$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment — right

⊢skip ~ x:=e: $P[e<2>/x<2>] \Rightarrow P$

Also pair of one-sided rules for while — we'll ignore for now

Rules of Relational Hoare-Logic Rules for Program Equivalence

RHL also has some rules allowing one to reason modulo program equivalence - we will not see there here.

How can we prove this?

```
s1:public 
s2:private 
r:private 
i:public 
proc Compare (s1:list[n] bool,s2:list[n] bool) 
i := 0;r:=0;while i<n \wedge r=0 do
  if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then 
    r:=1i := i + 1: n>0 / = l ow \Rightarrow \neg (= l ow)
```
How can we prove this?

```
s1:public 
s2:private 
r:private 
i:public 
proc Compare (s1:list[n] bool,s2:list[n] bool) 
i := 0;r:=0;while i<n do 
  if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then 
    r:=1i := i + 1: n>0 /\ =low ⇒ =low
```
Soundness

If we can derive \vdash c_1 ~ c_2 : $P\Rightarrow Q$ through the rules of the logic, then the quadruple $C_1 \sim C_2$: P⇒Q is valid.

Relative Completeness

If a quadruple c_1 ~ c_2 : P⇒Q is valid, and we we can derive $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ through the rules of the logic. have an oracle to derive all the true statements of the form $P\Rightarrow S$ and of the form $R\Rightarrow O$, then

Soundness and completeness with respect to Hoare Logic

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}\n\vdash_{\text{RHL}} & c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q \\
\downarrow & \text{iff} \\
\vdash_{\text{HL}} & c_1, c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q\n\end{array}
$$

Soundness and completeness with respect to Hoare Logic

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}\n\vdash_{\text{RHL}} & c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q \\
\downarrow & \text{iff} \\
\vdash_{\text{HL}} & c_1, c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q\n\end{array}
$$

Under the assumption that we can partition the memory adequately, and that we have termination.

Probabilistic Language

An example

OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg key $:=$ \$ Uniform($\{0, 1\}^n$); cipher := msg xor key; return cipher

Learning a ciphertext does not change any a priori knowledge about the likelihood of messages.

Probabilistic While (PWhile)

c::= abort | skip $| x := e$ $| x:=\xi d$ | c;c | if e then c else c | while e do c

 d_1 , d_2 , ... probabilistic expressions

Probabilistic Expressions

We extend the language with expression describing probability distributions.

$$
d: := f(e_1, ..., e_n, d_1, ..., d_k)
$$

Where f is a distribution declaration

Some expression examples

uniform($\{0,1\}$ ⁿ) gaussian(k,σ) laplace(k,b)

Semantics of Probabilistic **Expressions**

We would like to define it on the structure:

 $\{f(e_1,...,e_n,d_1,...,d_k)\}_m = \{f\}(\{e_1\}_{m},...,e_n,d_1\}_{m},...,d_k\})$

but is the result just a value?

Probabilistic Subdistributions

A discrete subdistribution over a set A is a function $\mu : A \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that the mass of μ , $|\mu| = \sum \mu(a)$ verifies $|\mu| \leq 1$. *a*∈*A*

The support of a discrete subdistribution µ, $supp(\mu) = {a \in A | \mu(a) > 0}$ is necessarily countable, i.e. finite or countably infinite.

We will denote the set of sub-distributions over A by D(A), and say that μ is of type D(A) denoted μ :D(A) if $\mu \in D(A)$.

Probabilistic Subdistributions

We call a subdistribution with mass exactly 1, a distribution.

We define the probability of an event E⊆A with respect to the subdistribution μ : $D(A)$ as

$$
\mathbb{P}_{\mu}[E] = \sum_{a \in E} \mu(a)
$$

Probabilistic Subdistributions

Let's consider µ∈D(A), and E⊆A, we have the following properties

 $\mathbb{P}_{\mu}[\varnothing] = 0$

 $\mathbb{P}_{\mu}[A] \leq 1$

 $0 \leq \mathbb{P}_{\mu}[E] \leq 1$

 $E \subseteq F \subseteq A$ implies $P_{\mu}[E] \leq P_{\mu}[F]$

 $E \subseteq A$ and $F \subseteq A$ implies $P_{\mu}[E \cup F] \leq P_{\mu}[E] + P_{\mu}[F] - P_{\mu}[E \cap F]$

We will denote by **O** the subdistribution μ defined as constant 0.

Operations over Probabilistic Subdistributions

Let's consider an arbitrary a∈A, we will often use the distribution unit(a) defined as:

$$
\mathbb{P}_{\text{unit}_{(a)}}[\{b\}] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
$$

We can think about unit as a function of type unit: $A \rightarrow D(A)$

Operations over Probabilistic Subdistributions

Let's consider a distribution $\mu \in D(A)$, and a function $M:A \rightarrow D(B)$ then we can define their composition by means of an expression let $a = \mu$ in M a defined as:

$$
\mathbb{P}_{\mathsf{let a = \mu in M a}}[E] = \sum_{a \in \mathsf{supp}(\mu)} \mathbb{P}_{\mu}[\{a\}] \cdot \mathbb{P}_{(Ma)}[E]
$$

Semantics of Probabilistic Expressions - revisited

We would like to define it on the structure:

 $\{f(e_1,...,e_n,d_1,...,d_k)\}_m = \{f\}(\{e_1\}_{m},...,e_n,\{d_1\}_{m},...,d_k)_m$

With input a memory m and output a subdistribution $\mu \in D(A)$ over the corresponding type A. E.g.

 ${uniform({0,1}^n)}_{m}\in D({0,1}^n)$

 ${q$ aussian(k,σ) }_m $[D(Real)]$

Semantics of PWhile **Commands**

What is the meaning of the following command?

k:=\$ uniform($\{0,1\}$ ⁿ); z:= x mod k;

Semantics of PWhile **Commands**

What is the meaning of the following command?

k:=\$ uniform($\{0,1\}$ ⁿ); z:= x mod k;

We can give the semantics as a function between command, memories and subdistributions over memories.

$$
Cmd \times Mem \rightarrow D(Mem)
$$

We will denote this relation as:

$$
\{\,c\,\}_{m}=\mu
$$

This is defined on the structure of commands:

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 ${abcrt}_m = 0$

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 ${skip}_m = unit(m)$

This is defined on the structure of commands:

 $\{\text{abort}\}_m = 0$ ${skip}_m = unit(m)$ ${x :=e}_m = unit(m[x \leftarrow {e}_m])$

This is defined on the structure of commands:

 $\{\text{abort}\}_m = \mathbf{O}$

 ${skip}_m = unit(m)$

 ${x :=e}_m = unit(m[x \leftarrow {e}_m])$

 ${c; c'}_{m} = let m'={c}_{m} in {c'}_{m'}.$

This is defined on the structure of commands:

 $\{\text{abort}\}_m = \mathbf{O}$ ${skip}_m = unit(m)$ ${x :=e}_m = unit(m[x \leftarrow {e}_m])$

 ${c; c'}_{m} = let m'={c}_{m} in {c'}_{m'}.$

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What about while

How did we handle the deterministic case?

What about while

$$
{\text{while}} e \text{ do } c\}_m = ??
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How did we handle the deterministic case?

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- **Where**

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\mu_n =
let m' = \{(which\ e\ do\ c)\}_{m} in {if e then abort}<sub>m'</sub>
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- We defined it as
- $\{while e do c\}_m = supp_{n \in Nat} \mu_n$
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Is this well defined?

This is defined on the structure of commands:

 $\{while e do c\}_m = supp_{n \in Nat} \mu_n$ $\mu_n=$ let m'={(whileⁿ e do c)}_m in {if e then abort}_{m'}
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Revisiting the example

OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg key $:=$ \$ Uniform($\{0, 1\}$ n); cipher := msg xor key; return cipher

Learning a ciphertext does not change any a priori knowledge about the likelihood of messages.

Revisiting the example

OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg key $:=$ $\frac{1}{2}$ Uniform $(\{0, 1\}^n)$; cipher := msg xor key; return cipher

Learning a ciphertext does not change any a priori knowledge about the likelihood of messages.

How do we formalize this?

Probabilistic Noninterference

A program prog is probabilistically noninterferent if and only if, whenever we run it on two low equivalent memories m_1 and m_2 we have that the probabilistic distributions we get as outputs are the same on public outputs.