Formal Reasoning for Security and Privacy Lecture 3

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Formal Semantics

We need to assign a formal meaning to the different

components:

Precondition

Program

Postcondition

formal semantics of specification conditions

formal semantics of programs

formal semantics of specification conditions

We also need to describe the rules which combine program and specifications.

Hoare triple

Precondition

Program

Postcondition

Precondition (a logical formula) Postcondition Program (a logical formula)

Rules of Hoare Logic:

⊢skip: P⇒P

 $\vdash x := e : P[e/x] \Rightarrow P$

 $\frac{\vdash c: P \Rightarrow R \quad \vdash c': R \Rightarrow Q}{\vdash c; c': P \Rightarrow Q}$

 $P \Rightarrow S$ $\vdash c: S \Rightarrow R$ $R \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash c: P \Rightarrow Q$

 $\vdash c_1:e \land P \Rightarrow Q \qquad \vdash c_2:\neg e \land P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash if e then c_1 else c_2: P \Rightarrow Q$


 \vdash c : e ∧ P \Rightarrow P \vdash while e do c : P \Rightarrow P ∧ \neg e

Information Flow Control

We want to guarantee that confidential information do not flow in what is considered nonconfidential.

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


- 1) $\{c\}_{m1} = \bot$ iff $\{c\}_{m2} = \bot$
- 2) $\{c\}_{m1}=m_1'$ and $\{c\}_{m2}=m_2'$ implies $m_1' \sim_{low} m_2'$


In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if

```
for every m<sub>1</sub> ~<sub>low</sub> m<sub>2</sub>:
```


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
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
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
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Relational Hoare Logic - RHL

Precondition (a logical formula)



Program₁ ~ Program₂

Postcondition

$$c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$
Program Program Postcondition (a logical formula)

Probabilistic Language

An example

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
  key :=$ Uniform({0,1}n);
  cipher := m xor key;
  return cipher
```

Learning a ciphertext does not change any a priori knowledge about the likelihood of messages.

Probabilistic While (PWhile)

d₁, d₂, ... probabilistic expressions

Probabilistic Subdistributions

A discrete subdistribution over a set A is a function

$$\mu: A \rightarrow [0, 1]$$

such that the mass of μ ,
 $|\mu| = \sum_{a \in A} \mu(a)$
verifies $|\mu| \le 1$.

The support of a discrete subdistribution μ , supp(μ) = {a \in A | μ (a) > 0} is necessarily countable, i.e. finite or countably infinite.

We will denote the set of sub-distributions over A by D(A), and say that μ is of type D(A) denoted μ :D(A) if $\mu \in D(A)$.

```
{while e do c}<sub>m</sub> = \sup_{n \in \mathbb{N}_{at}} \mu_n

\mu_n = let m' = { (while e do c) }<sub>m</sub> in {if e then abort}<sub>m'</sub>
```

$$\{abort\}_m = \mathbf{O}$$

```
{while e do c}_m = \sup_{n \in \mathbb{N}_{at}} \mu_n

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```
{abort}_m = \mathbf{O}
{skip}_m = unit(m)
```

```
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{x:=e}<sub>m</sub> = unit(m[x\leftarrow{e}<sub>m</sub>])
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{c;c'}<sub>m</sub> = let m' = {c}<sub>m</sub> in {c'}<sub>m'</sub>
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```
\{abort\}_m = \mathbf{0}
     \{skip\}_m = unit(m)
     \{x := e\}_m = unit(m[x \leftarrow \{e\}_m])
     \{c;c'\}_{m} = let m' = \{c\}_{m} in \{c'\}_{m'}
{if e then c_t else c_f}<sub>m</sub> = {C_t}<sub>m</sub> If {e}<sub>m</sub>=true
{while e do c}<sub>m</sub> = \sup_{n \in \mathbb{N}_{at}} \mu_n
\mu_n=let m' = \{ (while^n e do c) \}_m in \{ if e then abort \}_{m'}
```

This is defined on the structure of commands:

 $\{abort\}_m = \mathbf{0}$

```
\{skip\}_m = unit(m)
     \{x := e\}_m = unit(m[x \leftarrow \{e\}_m])
     \{c;c'\}_{m} = let m' = \{c\}_{m} in \{c'\}_{m'}
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{if e then c_t else c_f}<sub>m</sub> = {c_f}<sub>m</sub> | if {e}<sub>m</sub>=false
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\{abort\}_m = \mathbf{0}
     \{skip\}_m = unit(m)
     \{x := e\}_m = unit(m[x \leftarrow \{e\}_m])
     \{x:=\$ d\}_m = let a=\{d\}_m in unit(m[x\leftarrow a])
     \{c;c'\}_{m} = let m' = \{c\}_{m} in \{c'\}_{m'}
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How do we formalize this?

Probabilistic Noninterference

A program prog is probabilistically noninterferent if and only if, whenever we run it on two low equivalent memories m₁ and m₂ we have that the probabilistic distributions we get as outputs are the same on public outputs.

Low equivalence on distributions

Two distributions over memories μ_1 and μ_2 are low equivalent if and only if they coincide after projecting out all the private variables.

In symbols: µ1 ~low µ2

Example: Low equivalence on distributions

Consider memories with x private and y public. The distributions μ_1 and μ_2 defined as

```
\mu_1 ([x=2,y=0])=2/3, \mu_1 ([x=3,y=1])=1/3 and
```


$$\mu_2$$
 ([x=1,y=0])=1/3, μ_2 ([x=5,y=0])=1/3, μ_2 ([x=4,y=1])=1/3

are low equivalent.

Noninterference as a Relational Property

In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if for every $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$:

 $\{c\}_{m1}=\mu_1 \text{ and } \{c\}_{m2}=\mu_2 \text{ implies } \mu_1 \sim_{low} \mu_2$



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OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
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
How can we prove that this is noninterferent?

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 m_1 m_2

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OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
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```



 m_2

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
key :=$ Uniform({0,1}n);
cipher := m xor key;
return cipher

M1

M2

M1

M2

M2

M1

M2

M2

M4
```

We will show it is sound to pick, with some restrictions, a *function* of k as the key for m₂. What could we choose so that the cipher texts are equal?

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Properties of bitwise xor

$$C \oplus (a \oplus C) = a$$

Properties of bitwise xor

$$C \oplus (a \oplus C) = a$$

Example:

$$100\Phi (101\Phi 100) =$$

$$100 \oplus 001 = 101$$

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
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Applying the property above


Probabilistic Relational Hoare

Quadruples

Precondition

Program₁ ~ Program₂

Postcondition



Probabilistic Probabilistic Program Program

Postcondition

Precondition

Validity of Probabilistic Hoare quadruple


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We say that the quadruple c_1 \sim c_2 : P \rightarrow Q is valid if and only if for every pair of memories m_1, m_2 such that P(m_1, m_2) we have: \{c_1\}_{m_1} = \mu_1 and \{c_2\}_{m_2} = \mu_2 implies Q(\mu_1, \mu_2).
```

Validity of Probabilistic Hoare quadruple

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We say that the quadruple c_1 \sim c_2 : P \rightarrow Q is valid if and only if for every pair of memories m_1, m_2 such that P(m_1, m_2) we have: \{c_1\}_{m_1} = \mu_1 and \{c_2\}_{m_2} = \mu_2 implies Q(\mu_1, \mu_2).
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Is this correct?!?


Relational Assertions



logical formula over pair of memories (i.e., relation over memories)

logical formula over ????

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We need to lift Q to be a relation on distributions, and we do this using the notion of a *coupling* between distributions

Coupling formally

Given two sub-distributions $\mu_1 \in D(A)$, and $\mu_2 \in D(B)$, a coupling between them is a joint sub-distribution $\mu \in D(A \times B)$ whose *marginal* sub-distributions are μ_1 and μ_2 , respectively.

$$\pi_1(\mu)(a) = \sum_b \mu(a,b)$$
 $\pi_2(\mu)(b) = \sum_a \mu(a,b)$

$$\pi_1(\mu) = \mu_1$$
 $\pi_2(\mu) = \mu_2$

R-Coupling

Given two sub-distributions $\mu_1 \in D(A)$, and $\mu_2 \in D(B)$, an R-coupling between them, for $R \subseteq AxB$, is a joint sub-distribution $\mu \in D(AxB)$ such that:

- 1) the marginal sub-distributions of μ are μ₁ and μ₂, respectively,
- 2) the support of μ is contained in R. That is, if $\mu(a,b)>0$, then $(a,b)\in R$.

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.2511 0.25

 k_1

relation

$$k_1 = 10 \oplus k_2 \oplus 00$$

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.2511 0.25

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.2511 0.25

 k_1

 k_1

relation

$$k_1 = 10 \oplus k_2 \oplus 00$$

 k_2

		00	01	10	11
	00			0.25	
	O1				0.25
	10	0.25			
	11		0.25		

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.25

11 0.25

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.2511 0.25

relation

$$k_1=k_2$$
 or $k_1=k_2$ $\oplus 11$

OO 0.00 O1 0.50 1O 0.00 11 0.50

OO 0.25O1 0.251O 0.2511 0.25

 k_1

 k_1

relation

$$k_1=k_2$$
 or $k_1=k_2$ $\oplus 11$

 k_2

	00	01	10	11
00				0.25
O1		0.25		
10		0.25		
11				0.25

OO 0.00 O1 0.50 1O 0.00 11 0.50

Relational lifting of a predicate

We say that two sub-distributions $\mu_1 \in D(A)$ and $\mu_2 \in D(B)$ are in the relational lifting of the relation $R \subseteq AxB$, denoted $\mu_1 R * \mu_2$, if and only if there exists a sub-distribution $\mu \in D(AxB)$ such that:

- 1) if $\mu(a,b)>0$, then $(a,b)\in \mathbb{R}$.
- 2) $\pi_1(\mu) = \mu_1$ and $\pi_2(\mu) = \mu_2$

Relational lifting of a predicate

We say that two sub-distributions $\mu_1 \in D(A)$ and $\mu_2 \in D(B)$ are in the relational lifting of the relation $R \subseteq AxB$, denoted $\mu_1 R * \mu_2$, if and only if there exists a sub-distribution $\mu \in D(AxB)$ such that:

- 1) if $\mu(a,b)>0$, then $(a,b)\in \mathbb{R}$.
- 2) $\pi_1(\mu) = \mu_1$ and $\pi_2(\mu) = \mu_2$

I.e., there is an R-coupling for μ_1 and μ_2

Suppose E and F are predicates on memories. If we know

```
\mu_1 (E<1> <=> F<2>)* \mu_2, then we can conclude that
```

$$Pr_{\mu 1}[E] Pr_{\mu 2}[F]$$

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```
\mu_1 (E<1> => F<2>)* \mu_2, then we can conclude that
```

$$Pr_{\mu 1}[E] \leq Pr_{\mu 2}[F]$$

Validity of Probabilistic Hoare quadruple

```
We say that the quadruple c_1 \sim c_2 : P \rightarrow Q is valid if and only if for every pair of memories m_1, m_2 such that P(m_1, m_2) we have: \{c_1\}_{m_1} = \mu_1 and \{c_2\}_{m_2} = \mu_2 implies Q^*(\mu_1, \mu_2).
```

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Skip

⊢skip~skip:P⇒P

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Assignment

```
\vdash x_1 := e_1 \sim x_2 := e_2 :
P[e_1 < 1 > / x_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > / x_2 < 2 >] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > / x_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > / x_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > / x_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > / x_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1 > , e_2 < 2 > ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1    ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1     ] \Rightarrow P[e_1 < 1
```

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Composition

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow R$$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow R \qquad \vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : R \Rightarrow S$$

$$\vdash c_1; c_1' \sim c_2; c_2' : P \Rightarrow S$$

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Consequence

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : S \Rightarrow R$$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

We can weaken P, i.e. replace it by something that is implied by P. In this case S.

We can strengthen Q, i.e. replace it by something that implies Q. In this case R.

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else

```
P \Rightarrow (e_1 < 1) \Leftrightarrow e_2 < 2)
\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q
\vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : \neg e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1'
\vdash \qquad \qquad \qquad : P \Rightarrow Q

if e_2 then c_2 else c_2'
```

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic While

```
P ⇒ (e<sub>1</sub><1> ⇔ e<sub>2</sub><2>)

⊢c<sub>1</sub>~c<sub>2</sub> : e<sub>1</sub><1> ∧ P ⇒ P

while e<sub>1</sub> do c<sub>1</sub>

~ :P⇒P∧¬e<sub>1</sub><1>

while e<sub>2</sub> do c<sub>2</sub>
```

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else - left

```
\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q

\vdash c_1' \sim c_2 : \neg e < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q
```

```
if e then c<sub>1</sub> else c<sub>1</sub>'
⊢

c<sub>2</sub>

:P⇒Q

c<sub>2</sub>
```

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic If-then-else - right

```
\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow Q
\vdash c_1 \sim c_2' : \neg e < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow Q
```

```
c_1

c_1

c_2

if e then c_2 else c_2.
```

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Assignment - left

```
\vdash x := e \sim skip:
P[e < 1 > / x < 1 >] \rightarrow P
```

How about the random assignment?

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Random Assignment

```
-x_1 := $ d_1 \sim x_2 := $ d_2 : ?? <math>\Rightarrow Q
```

We would like to have:

```
for all m_1, m_2, P(m_1, m_2) \Rightarrow
let a=\{d_1\}_{m1} in unit(m_1[x_1\leftarrow a])
Q^*
let a=\{d_2\}_{m2} in unit(m_2[x_2\leftarrow a])
```

```
\vdash x_1 := \$ d_1 \sim x_2 := \$ d_2 : P \Rightarrow Q
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```

$$\vdash x_1 := \$ d_1 \sim x_2 := \$ d_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

What is the problem with this rule?

Restricted Probabilistic Expressions

We consider a restricted set of expressions denoting probability distributions.

$$d::= f(d_1, ..., d_k)$$

Where f is a distribution declaration

Some expression examples similar to the previous

```
uniform (\{0,1\}^{128}) bernoulli(.5) laplace(0,1)
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Notice that we don't need a memory anymore to interpret them

Isomorphisms on Sub-distributions

Given two sub-distributions $\mu_1 \in D(A)$ and $\mu_2 \in D(B)$, we say that a mapping h:A \rightarrow B is an *isomorphism* between μ_1 and μ_2 (h \triangleleft (μ_1,μ_2)) if and only iff:

- h is a bijective map between elements in supp(µ₁) and supp(µ₂),
- 2) for all $a \in A$, $\mu_1(a) = \mu_2(h(a))$

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic Random Assignment

```
P=h \triangleleft (d_1, d_2) \land we let h's definition refer to program variables tagged with <1> or <2> v \in \text{supp}(d_1) \Rightarrow Q[v/x_1<1>, h(v)/x_2<2>]
```

$$-x_1 :=$$
\$ $d_1 \sim x_2 :=$ \$ $d_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg
  key :=$ Uniform({0,1}n);
  cipher := m xor key;
  return cipher
```

$$m<1>$$
 $m<2>$ \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow $m<1>\oplus k$ $m<2>\oplus (m<1>\oplus k\oplus m<2>)$

```
d_1=Uniform(\{0,1\}^n)
```

 d_2 =Uniform({0,1}ⁿ)

$$h(k) = (m<1> \oplus k \oplus m<2>)$$

Is this an isomorphism from d₁ to d₂?

- 1) Is it bijective between elements in the support of d₁ and d₂?
- 2) Is it true that for all $v \in \{0,1\}^n$, $d_1(v) = d_2(h(v))$?

```
d_1=Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) d_2
```

$$d_2$$
=Uniform({0,1}ⁿ)

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Yes, it's an isomorphism!

```
h(k)=m<1>⊕k⊕m<2>, d_1 = d_2 = Uniform({0,1}^n)

P = h\triangleleft(d<sub>1</sub>,d<sub>2</sub>)∧

\forallv,v\insupport(d<sub>1</sub>) ⇒

m<1>⊕k<sub>1</sub><1>=m<2>⊕k<sub>2</sub><2>[v/k<sub>1</sub><1>,h(v)/k<sub>2</sub><2>]
```

```
\vdash k_1 := \$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) \sim k_2 := \$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) :
P \Rightarrow m < 1 > \oplus k_1 < 1 > = m < 2 > \oplus k_2 < 2 >
```

```
h(k)=m<1>\oplusk\oplusm<2>, d<sub>1</sub> = d<sub>2</sub> = Uniform({0,1}<sup>n</sup>)

P = h\triangleleft (d<sub>1</sub>,d<sub>2</sub>) \wedge

\forallv,v\insupport(d<sub>1</sub>) \Rightarrow

m<1>\oplusv=m<2>\oplus (m<1>\oplusv\oplusm<2>)
```

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\vdash k_1 := \$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) \sim k_2 := \$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) :
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```

```
P = h \triangleleft (d_1, d_2) \land \forall v, v \in \text{support}(d_1) \Rightarrow \\ m < 1 > \theta v = m < 2 > \theta \text{ } (m < 1 > \theta v \theta m < 2 >)
True \Rightarrow P
\vdash k_1 := \$Uniform(\{0, 1\}^n) \sim k_2 := \$Uniform(\{0, 1\}^n) :
P \Rightarrow m < 1 > \theta k_1 < 1 > = m < 2 > \theta k_2 < 2 >
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-k_1:=\$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) \sim k_2:=\$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n):
True \Rightarrow m<1>\oplus k_1<1>=m<2>\oplus k_2<2>
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-k_1:=\$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n) \sim k_2:=\$Uniform(\{0,1\}^n):
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```

By Consequence

Soundness

If we can derive $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ through the rules of the logic, then the quadruple $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ is valid.

Completeness?