
#### CS 591: Formal Methods in Security and Privacy Non-interference

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From the previous classes



Program

Postcondition (a logical formula)

Validity of Hoare triple We say that the triple  $c:P \Rightarrow Q$  is valid if and only if for every memory m such that P(m) and memory m' such that  $\{c\}_m = m'$ we have Q(m').

Is this condition easy to check?

### Rules of Hoare Logic Skip

#### $\vdash skip: P \Rightarrow P$


#### Rules of Hoare Logic abort

#### ⊢abort: true⇒false

### Rules of Hoare Logic Assignment

#### $\vdash x := e : P[e/x] \Rightarrow P$

#### Rules of Hoare Logic Composition



 $\vdash_{C;C'}: P \Rightarrow Q$ 

### Rules of Hoare Logic Consequence

## $P \Rightarrow S \qquad \vdash c : S \Rightarrow R \qquad R \Rightarrow Q$

#### $\vdash_{C}: P \Rightarrow Q$

We can weaken P, i.e. replace it by something that is implied by P. In this case S.

We can strengthen Q, i.e. replace it by something that implies Q. In this case R.

#### Rules of Hoare Logic If then else

#### Rules of Hoare Logic While

#### $\vdash c : e \land P \Rightarrow P$

## ⊢while e do c : P ⇒ P ∧ ¬e Invariant

#### Soundness

If we can derive  $\vdash_{C} : P \Rightarrow Q$  through the rules of the logic, then the triple  $C : P \Rightarrow Q$  is valid.

# Relative Completeness $P \Rightarrow S$ $\vdash c: S \Rightarrow R$ $R \Rightarrow Q$

$$\vdash_{\mathsf{C}} : \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow \mathsf{Q}$$

If a triple  $C : P \Rightarrow Q$  is valid, and we have an oracle to derive all the true statements of the form  $P \Rightarrow S$  and of the form  $R \Rightarrow Q$ , then we can derive  $\vdash C : P \Rightarrow Q$  through the rules of the logic. Some Examples of Security Properties

- Access Control
- Encryption
- Malicious Behavior Detection
- Information Filtering

Information Flow Control

#### Private vs Public


We want to distinguish confidential information that need to be kept secret from nonconfidential information that can be accessed by everyone.

We assume that every variable is tagged with one either public or private.

x:public x:private

### **Information Flow Control**

We want to guarantee that confidential information do not flow in what is considered nonconfidential.



Today: Noninterference -Relational Hoare Logic How can we formulate a policy that forbids flows from private to public?

### Low equivalence

Two memories m<sub>1</sub> and m<sub>2</sub> are low equivalent if and only if they coincide in the value that they assign to public variables.


In symbols: m<sub>1</sub> ~<sub>low</sub> m<sub>2</sub>


## Noninterference

- A program prog is noninterferent if and only if, whenever we run it on two low equivalent memories  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  we have that:
- 1) Either both terminate or both nonterminate
- 2) If they both terminate we obtain two low equivalent memories m<sub>1</sub>' and m<sub>2</sub>'.


## Noninterference

- In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if for every  $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$ :
- 1)  $\{c\}_{m1} = \perp \text{ iff } \{c\}_{m2} = \perp$
- 2) {c}<sub>m1</sub>=m<sub>1</sub>' and {c}<sub>m2</sub>=m<sub>2</sub>' implies  $m_1' \sim_{low} m_2'$












### Is this program secure?





x:private y:public if  $y \mod 3 = 0$  then x:=1 else x := 0




x:private y: public if  $x \mod 3 = 0$  then y:=1 else V := 0



x:private y: public if  $x \mod 3 = 0$  then y:=1 else v:=1









```
s1:public
```

```
s2:private
```

```
r:private
```

```
i:public
```

```
proc Compare (s1:list[n] bool,s2:list[n] bool)
i:=0;
r:=0;
while i<n /\ r=0 do
    if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then
        r:=1
        i:=i+1</pre>
```



```
s1:public
s2:private
r:private
i:public
proc Compare (s1:list[n] bool,s2:list[n] bool)
i:=0;
r:=0;
while i<n do
if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then
    r:=1
 i:=i+1
```




# How can we prove our programs noninterferent?

## Noninterference

- In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if
- for every  $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$ :
- 1) {c}<sub>m1</sub>= $\perp$  iff {c}<sub>m2</sub>= $\perp$
- 2) {c}<sub>m1</sub>=m<sub>1</sub>' and {c}<sub>m2</sub>=m<sub>2</sub>' implies  $m_1' \sim_{low} m_2'$

Is this condition easy to check?



(a logical formula)


Validity of Hoare triple We say that the triple  $c:P \Rightarrow Q$  is valid if and only if for every memory m such that P(m) and memory m' such that  $\{c\}_{m}=m'$ we have Q(m').


> Validity talks only about one memory. How can we manage two memories?

### **Relational Property**

In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if

- for every  $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$  :
- 1) {c}<sub>m1</sub>= $\perp$  iff {c}<sub>m2</sub>= $\perp$
- 2) {c}<sub>m1</sub>=m<sub>1</sub>' and {c}<sub>m2</sub>=m<sub>2</sub>' implies  $m_1' \sim_{low} m_2'$





## Relational Assertions $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ $\uparrow$ Need to talk about variables

of the two memories

 $c_1 \sim c_2 : x\langle 1 \rangle \le x\langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow x\langle 1 \rangle \ge x\langle 2 \rangle$ Tags describing which memory we are referring to.

## Validity of Hoare quadruple

We say that the quadruple  $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$  is

valid if and only if for every pair of memories  $m_1, m_2$  such that  $P(m_1, m_2)$  we have:

- 1)  $\{c_1\}_{m_1} = \perp \text{ iff } \{c_2\}_{m_2} = \perp$
- 2)  $\{c_1\}_{m1}=m_1 \text{ and } \{c_2\}_{m2}=m_2 \text{ implies}$ Q(m<sub>1</sub>',m<sub>2</sub>').

#### Is this easy to check?

#### Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Skip

#### $\vdash skip \sim skip: P \Rightarrow P$

#### Rules of Relational Hoare Logic abort

#### Habort~abort:true⇒false

#### Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment

 $F_{x} := e^{x} := e$