

CS 591: Formal Methods in Security and Privacy

RHL and probabilistic computations

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From the previous classes


NonInterference

In symbols, c is **noninterferent** if and only if


for every $m_1 \sim_{\text{low}} m_2$:

1) $\{c\}_{m_1} = \perp$ iff $\{c\}_{m_2} = \perp$

2) $\{c\}_{m_1} = m_1'$ and $\{c\}_{m_2} = m_2'$ implies $m_1' \sim_{\text{low}} m_2'$



Relational Hoare Logic - RHL



Some Rules of Relational Hoare Logic

$$\vdash \text{skip} \sim \text{skip} : P \Rightarrow P$$

$$\vdash \text{abort} \sim \text{abort} : \text{true} \Rightarrow \text{false}$$

$$\vdash x_1 := e_1 \sim x_2 := e_2 :$$
$$P [e_1 \langle 1 \rangle / x_1 \langle 1 \rangle, e_2 \langle 2 \rangle / x_2 \langle 2 \rangle] \Rightarrow P$$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow R \quad \vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : R \Rightarrow S$$

$$\vdash c_1 ; c_1' \sim c_2 ; c_2' : P \Rightarrow S$$

$$P \Rightarrow S \quad \vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : S \Rightarrow R \quad R \Rightarrow Q$$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

Some Rules of Relational Hoare Logic

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e_1 \langle 1 \rangle \wedge P \Rightarrow Q \quad P \Rightarrow e_1 \langle 1 \rangle = e_2 \langle 2 \rangle$$
$$\vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : \neg e_1 \langle 1 \rangle \wedge P \Rightarrow Q$$

$$\vdash \begin{array}{l} \text{if } e_1 \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_1' \\ \sim \\ \text{if } e_2 \text{ then } c_2 \text{ else } c_2' \end{array} : P \Rightarrow Q$$
$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e_1 \langle 1 \rangle \wedge P \Rightarrow P \quad P \Rightarrow e_1 \langle 1 \rangle = e_2 \langle 2 \rangle$$

$$\vdash \begin{array}{l} \text{while } e_1 \text{ do } c_1 \\ \sim \\ \text{while } e_2 \text{ do } c_2 \end{array} : P \Rightarrow P \wedge \neg e_1 \langle 1 \rangle$$

One-sided Rules

$$\frac{\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e \langle 1 \rangle \wedge P \Rightarrow Q \quad \vdash c_1' \sim c_2 : \neg e \langle 1 \rangle \wedge P \Rightarrow Q}{\vdash \text{if } e \text{ then } \underset{\sim}{c_1} \text{ else } c_1' : P \Rightarrow Q}$$

$$\frac{\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e \langle 2 \rangle \wedge P \Rightarrow Q \quad \vdash c_1 \sim c_2' : \neg e \langle 2 \rangle \wedge P \Rightarrow Q}{\vdash \text{if } e \text{ then } \underset{\sim}{c_1} \text{ else } c_2' : P \Rightarrow Q}$$

How can we prove this?

```
s1:public
s2:private
r:private
i:public

proc Compare (s1:list[n] bool,s2:list[n] bool)
i:=0;
r:=0;
while i<n do
  if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then
    r:=1
  i:=i+1
: n>0 /\ =low ⇒ =low
```


Today: more on RHL and probabilistic computations

What do we do if our two programs have different forms? There are three pairs of *one-sided* rules.

Assignment — left

$\vdash x := e \sim \text{skip} :$

$P [e \langle 1 \rangle / x \langle 1 \rangle] \Rightarrow P$

Assignment — right

$\vdash \text{skip} \sim x := e :$

$P [e \langle 2 \rangle / x \langle 2 \rangle] \Rightarrow P$

Also pair of one-sided rules for while — we'll ignore for now

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic

Program Equivalence Rule

$$\models P : c_1' \equiv c_1$$

$$\models P : c_2' \equiv c_2$$

$$\vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : P \Rightarrow Q$$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

$\models P : c_1 \equiv c_2$ means $\{c_1\}_m = \{c_2\}_m$

for all m such that $P(m)$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic

Program Equivalences

$$\models P : \text{skip}; c \equiv c$$

$$\models P : c; \text{skip} \equiv c$$

$$\models P : (c1; c2); c3 \equiv c1; (c2; c3)$$

...

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic

Combining Composition and Equivalence

We can combine the Composition and Program Equivalence Rules to split commands where we like:

$$\vdash C_1 ; C_2 \sim C_1' : P \Rightarrow R$$

$$\vdash C_3 \sim C_2' ; C_3' : R \Rightarrow Q$$

$$\vdash C_1 ; C_2 ; C_3 \sim C_1' ; C_2' ; C_3' : P \Rightarrow Q$$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic

Combining Composition and Equivalence

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \vdash c_1 \sim \text{skip} : P \Rightarrow R \\ \vdash c_2 \sim c_1' : R \Rightarrow Q \end{array}}{\vdash c_1 ; c_2 \sim \text{skip} ; c_1' : P \Rightarrow Q}}$$
$$\frac{\vdash c_1 ; c_2 \sim \text{skip} ; c_1' : P \Rightarrow Q}{\vdash c_1 ; c_2 \sim c_1' : P \Rightarrow Q}}$$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic

Combining Composition and Equivalence

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \vdash C_1 \sim C_1' : P \Rightarrow R \\ \vdash C_2 \sim \text{skip} : R \Rightarrow Q \end{array}}{\vdash C_1 ; C_2 \sim C_1' ; \text{skip} : P \Rightarrow Q}}{\vdash C_1 ; C_2 \sim C_1' : P \Rightarrow Q}$$

Soundness

If we can derive $\vdash C_1 \sim C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ through the rules of the logic, then the quadruple $C_1 \sim C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ is valid.

Validity of Hoare quadruple

We say that the quadruple $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ is **valid** if and only if for every pair of memories m_1, m_2 such that $P(m_1, m_2)$ we have:

- 1) $\{c_1\}_{m_1} = \perp$ iff $\{c_2\}_{m_2} = \perp$
- 2) $\{c_1\}_{m_1} = m_1'$ and $\{c_2\}_{m_2} = m_2'$ implies $Q(m_1', m_2')$.

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How do we check this?

Relative Completeness

If a quadruple $C_1 \sim C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ is valid, and we have an oracle to derive all the true statements of the form $P \Rightarrow S$ and of the form $R \Rightarrow Q$, then we can derive $\vdash C_1 \sim C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ through the rules of the logic.

Soundness and completeness with respect to Hoare Logic

$\vdash_{\text{RHL}} C_1 \sim C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$

iff

$\vdash_{\text{HL}} C_1; C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$

Soundness and completeness with respect to Hoare Logic

$$\vdash_{\text{RHL}} C_1 \sim C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

iff

$$\vdash_{\text{HL}} C_1 ; C_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

Under the assumption that we can partition the memory adequately, and that we have termination.

Possible projects

In Easycrypt

- Look at how to guarantee trace-based noninterference.
- Look at how to guarantee side-channel free noninterference.
- Look at the relations between self-composition and relational logic.

Not related to Easycrypt

- Look at type systems for non-interference.
- Look at other methods for relational reasoning
- Look at declassification

Probabilistic Language

An example

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg  
  key := $ Uniform({0,1}n);  
  cipher := msg xor key;  
  return cipher
```

Learning a ciphertext does not change any a priori knowledge about the likelihood of messages.

Probabilistic While (PWhile)

```
c ::= abort
    | skip
    | x := e
    | x := $ d
    | c ; c
    | if e then c else c
    | while e do c
```

d_1, d_2, \dots probabilistic expressions

Probabilistic Expressions

We extend the language with expression describing probability distributions.

$$d ::= f(e_1, \dots, e_n, d_1, \dots, d_k)$$

Where f is a distribution declaration

Some expression examples

`uniform({0, 1}n)` `gaussian(k, σ)` `laplace(k, b)`

Semantics of Probabilistic Expressions

We would like to define it on the structure:

$$\{f(e_1, \dots, e_n, d_1, \dots, d_k)\}_m = \{f\}(\{e_1\}_m, \dots, \{e_n\}_m, \{d_1\}_m, \dots, \{d_k\}_m)$$

but is the result just a value?

Probabilistic Subdistributions

A **discrete subdistribution** over a set A is a function

$$\mu : A \rightarrow [0, 1]$$

such that the mass of μ ,

$$|\mu| = \sum_{a \in A} \mu(a)$$

verifies $|\mu| \leq 1$.

The support of a discrete subdistribution μ ,

$$\text{supp}(\mu) = \{a \in A \mid \mu(a) > 0\}$$

is necessarily countable, i.e. finite or countably infinite.

We will denote the set of sub-distributions over A by $D(A)$, and say that μ is of type $D(A)$ denoted $\mu : D(A)$ if $\mu \in D(A)$.

Probabilistic Subdistributions

We call a subdistribution with mass exactly 1, a **distribution**.

We define the **probability** of an event $E \subseteq A$ with respect to the subdistribution $\mu: D(A)$ as

$$\mathbb{P}_\mu[E] = \sum_{a \in E} \mu(a)$$

Probabilistic Subdistributions

Let's consider $\mu \in \mathcal{D}(A)$, and $E \subseteq A$, we have the following properties

$$\mathbb{P}_\mu[\emptyset] = 0$$

$$\mathbb{P}_\mu[A] \leq 1$$

$$0 \leq \mathbb{P}_\mu[E] \leq 1$$

$$E \subseteq F \subseteq A \text{ implies } \mathbb{P}_\mu[E] \leq \mathbb{P}_\mu[F]$$

$$E \subseteq A \text{ and } F \subseteq A \text{ implies } \mathbb{P}_\mu[E \cup F] \leq \mathbb{P}_\mu[E] + \mathbb{P}_\mu[F] - \mathbb{P}_\mu[E \cap F]$$

We will denote by $\mathbf{0}$ the subdistribution μ defined as constant 0.

Operations over Probabilistic Subdistributions

Let's consider an arbitrary $a \in A$, we will often use the distribution $\text{unit}(a)$ defined as:

$$\mathbb{P}_{\text{unit}(a)}[\{b\}] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a=b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We can think about unit as a function of type $\text{unit}:A \rightarrow D(A)$

Operations over Probabilistic Subdistributions

Let's consider a distribution $\mu \in D(A)$, and a function $M: A \rightarrow D(B)$ then we can define their composition by means of an expression $\text{let } a = \mu \text{ in } M a$ defined as:

$$\mathbb{P} \text{let } a = \mu \text{ in } M a [E] = \sum_{a \in \text{supp}(\mu)} \mathbb{P}_{\mu}[\{a\}] \cdot \mathbb{P}_{(Ma)}[E]$$

Semantics of Probabilistic Expressions - revisited

We would like to define it on the structure:

$$\{f(e_1, \dots, e_n, d_1, \dots, d_k)\}_m = \{f\}(\{e_1\}_m, \dots, \{e_n\}_m, \{d_1\}_m, \dots, \{d_k\}_m)$$

With input a memory m and output a subdistribution $\mu \in D(A)$ over the corresponding type A . E.g.

$$\{\text{uniform}(\{0, 1\}^n)\}_{m \in D(\{0, 1\}^n)}$$

$$\{\text{gaussian}(k, \sigma)\}_{m \in D(\text{Real})}$$

Semantics of PWhile Commands

What is the meaning of the following command?

```
k := $ uniform({0, 1}n); z := x mod k;
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We can give the semantics as a function between **command**, **memories** and **subdistributions over memories**.

$$\text{Cmd} * \text{Mem} \rightarrow D(\text{Mem})$$

We will denote this relation as:

$$\{c\}_m = \mu$$

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Semantics of While

What about while

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$\{\text{while } e \text{ do } c\}_m = ???$

How did we handle the deterministic case?

Semantics of While

We defined it as

$$\{\text{while } e \text{ do } c\}_m = \sup_{n \in \text{Nat}} \mu_n$$

Where

$$\mu_n = \text{let } m' = \{\text{while}^n e \text{ do } c\}_m \text{ in } \{\text{if } e \text{ then abort}\}_{m'}$$

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$$\mu_n = \text{let } m' = \{ (\text{while}^n e \text{ do } c) \}_m \text{ in } \{\text{if } e \text{ then abort}\}_{m'}$$

Is this well defined?

Semantics of Commands

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Revisiting the example

```
OneTimePad(m : private msg) : public msg  
  key := $ Uniform({0,1}n);  
  cipher := msg xor key;  
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```

Learning a ciphertext does not change any a priori knowledge about the likelihood of messages.

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How do we formalize this?


Probabilistic Noninterference

A program prog is **probabilistically noninterferent** if and only if, whenever we run it on two **low equivalent** memories m_1 and m_2 we have that the **probabilistic distributions we get as outputs are the same on public outputs.**

Noninterference as a Relational Property

In symbols, c is **noninterferent** if and only if for every $m_1 \sim_{\text{low}} m_2$:

$\{c\}_{m_1} = \mu_1$ and $\{c\}_{m_2} = \mu_2$ implies $\mu_1 \sim_{\text{low}} \mu_2$



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How can we prove that this is noninterferent?