CS 591: Formal Methods in Security and Privacy Non-interference

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Rules of Hoare Logic: ⊢abort: P⇒Q ⊢skip: P⇒P $\vdash x := e : P[e/x] \Rightarrow P$ P⇒S ⊢c:S⇒R R⇒Q $\vdash c: P \Rightarrow R \vdash c': R \Rightarrow Q$ ⊢c;c′: P⇒O ⊢c: P⇒O \vdash if e then c_1 else c_2 : $P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash c : e \land P \Rightarrow P$ $\vdash while e do c : P \Rightarrow P \land \neg e$

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Rules of Hoare Logic: ⊢abort: P⇒Q ⊢skip: P⇒P $\vdash x := e : P[e/x] \Rightarrow P$ $\vdash c: P \Rightarrow R \vdash c': R \Rightarrow Q P \Rightarrow S \vdash c: S \Rightarrow R R \Rightarrow Q$ ⊢c: P⇒O \vdash C; C': P \Rightarrow Q $\vdash c_1:e \land P \Rightarrow Q \qquad \vdash c_2:\neg e \land P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash if e then c_1 else c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash c : e \land P \Rightarrow P$ $\vdash while e do c : P \Rightarrow P \land \neg e$

Weakest precondition calculus

Predicate Transformer Semantics



Given a program c and an assertion P we can define an assertion wp(c,P) which is the weakest precondition of c and P, i.e. c: wp(c, P) \Rightarrow P is a valid triple, and for every triple $c:Q \Rightarrow P$ we have $Q \Rightarrow wp(c, P)$

Weakest precondition

This is defined on the structure of commands:

$$\begin{split} & \text{wp}(\text{abort}, P) = \text{false} \\ & \text{wp}(\text{skip}, P) = P \\ & \text{wp}(\text{skip}, P) = P[\text{x} \leftarrow \{e\}_m] \\ & \text{wp}(\text{x}:=e, P) = P[\text{x} \leftarrow \{e\}_m] \\ & \text{wp}(\text{c};\text{c}', P) = \text{wp}(\text{c}, \text{wp}(\text{c}', P)) \\ & \text{wp}(\text{if e then } c_t \text{ else } c_f, P) = (e \Rightarrow \text{wp}(\text{c}_t, P)) \land (\neg e \Rightarrow \text{wp}(\text{c}_t, P)) \\ & \text{wp}(\text{while } e \text{ do } c, P) = \exists_{n \in \text{Nat}} P_n \text{ where} \end{split}$$

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 $P_0 = \neg e \land P$ $P_{n+1} = e \land wp(c, P_n)$

Security as information flow control

Some Examples of Security Properties

- Access Control
- Encryption
- Malicious Behavior Detection
- Information Filtering
- Information Flow Control

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Private vs Public

We want to distinguish confidential information that need to be kept secret from nonconfidential information that can be accessed by everyone.

We assume that every variable is tagged with one either public or private.

x:public x:private

Information Flow Control

We want to guarantee that confidential information do not flow in what is considered nonconfidential.

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x:private y: public if $y \mod 3 = 0$ then x:=1 else x := 0

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x:private y:public if $x \mod 3 = 0$ then y:=1 else V:=0

x:private y:public if $x \mod 3 = 0$ then y:=1 else V := 0



How can we formulate a policy that forbids flows from private to public?

Low equivalence

Two memories m₁ and m₂ are low equivalent if and only if they coincide in the value that they assign to public variables.

In symbols: m₁ ~_{low} m₂

Noninterference A program prog is noninterferent if and only if, whenever we run it on two memories m₁ and m₂ that are low equivalent, we obtain two memories m₁' and m₂' which are also low equivalent.











 $m^{in_1}=[x=n_1,y=k]$



mⁱⁿ1=[x=n1,y=k]

mⁱⁿ2=[x=n2,y=k]

mⁱⁿ2=[x=n2,y=k] m^{out}2=[x=k,y=k]

 $m^{in_1}=[x=n_1,y=k]$

m^{out}₁=[x=k,y=k]





mⁱⁿ1=[x=n1,y=k]


 $m^{in_1} = [x = n_1, y = k]$

mⁱⁿ₂=[x=n₂,y=k]

 $\begin{array}{ll} m^{in} = [x = n_1, y = k] & m^{in} = [x = n_2, y = k] \\ m^{out} = [x = n_1, y = n_1] & m^{out} = [x = n_2, y = n_2] \end{array}$





Yes



Yes

mⁱⁿ1=[x=n1,y=k]



 $m^{in_1} = [x = n_1, y = k]$

mⁱⁿ2=[x=n2,y=k]



 $m^{in}{}_{1}=[x=n_{1},y=k] \qquad m^{in}{}_{2}=[x=n_{2},y=k]$ $m^{out}{}_{1}=[x=n_{1},y=5] \qquad m^{out}{}_{2}=[x=n_{2},y=5]$

x:private
y:public
if y mod 3 = 0 then
x:=1
else
x:=0



 $m^{in_1}=[x=n_1,y=6]$



 $m^{in_1}=[x=n_1,y=6]$

mⁱⁿ₂=[x=n₂,y=6]

mⁱⁿ1=[x=n1,y=6]

mⁱⁿ₂=[x=n₂,y=6]

m^{out}₁=[x=1,y=6]

m^{out}₂=[x=1,y=6]







 $m^{in_1}=[x=6,y=k]$



 $m^{in_1}=[x=6,y=k]$

mⁱⁿ₂=[x=5,y=k]

x:private
y:public
if x mod 3 = 0 then
y:=1
else
y:=0

$$m^{in}_1=[x=6,y=k]$$

 $m^{in}_2=[x=5,y=k]$

 $m^{out_1} = [x=6, y=1]$

m^{out}₂=[x=5,y=0]

```
s1:public
s2:private
r:private
i:public
proc Compare (s1:list[n] bool,s2:list[n] bool)
i:=0;
r:=0;
while i < n / r = 0 do
 if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then
    r:=1
 i:=i+1
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How can we prove our programs noninterferent?

Noninterference

In symbols, c is noninterferent if and only if for every $m_1 \sim_{low} m_2$: 1) {c}m_1= \perp iff {c}m_2= \perp 2) {c}m_1=m_1' and {c}m_2=m_2' implies $m_1' \sim_{low} m_2'$

Is this condition easy to check?



Validity of Hoare triple We say that the triple c: P⇒Q is valid if and only if for every memory m such that P(m) and memory m' such that {c}_m=m' we have Q(m').

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> Validity talks only about one memory. How can we manage two memories?















Relational Assertions $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$

Need to talk about variables of the two memories

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$c_1 \sim c_2 : x\langle 1 \rangle \le x\langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow x\langle 1 \rangle \ge x\langle 2 \rangle$

Relational Assertions $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$

Need to talk about variables of the two memories

$$\begin{array}{ccc} c_1 \sim c_2 : x \langle 1 \rangle \leq x \langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow x \langle 1 \rangle \geq x \langle 2 \rangle \\ \uparrow & \uparrow \\ & \text{Tags describing which} \\ & \text{memory we are referring to.} \end{array}$$

Validity of Hoare quadruple We say that the quadruple $c_1 \sim c_2 : P \rightarrow Q$ is valid if and only if for every pair of memories m_1, m_2 such that $P(m_1, m_2)$ we have: 1) $\{c_1\}_{m_1} = \perp \text{ iff } \{c_2\}_{m_2} = \perp$ 2) $\{c_1\}_{m_1}=m_1$ ' and $\{c_2\}_{m_2}=m_2$ ' implies $Q(m_1', m_2')$.
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Is this easy to check?

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Skip

⊢skip~skip:P⇒P

Correctness of an axiom

We say that an axiom is correct if we can prove the validity of each instance of the conclusion.

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Is this still good for RHL?

Correctness of Skip Rule

To show this rule correct we need to show the validity of the quadruple skip~skip: P⇒P.

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For every m_1 , m_2 such that $P(m_1, m_2)$ and m_1' , m_2' such that $\{skip\}_{m1}=m_1'$ and $\{skip\}_{m2}=m_2'$ we need $P(m_1', m_2')$.

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> Follow easily by our semantics: {skip}m=m

Habort~abort:true⇒false

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Habort~abort:true⇒false

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For every m_1, m_2 such that $P(m_1, m_2)$ we can show {abort}_m_1= \perp iff {abort}_m_2= \perp .

Follow easily by our semantics: ${abort}_{m}=\perp$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Assignment

 $\vdash x_1 := e_1 \sim x_2 := e_2 :$ $P[e_1 < 1 > / x_1 < 1 >, e_2 < 2 > / x_2 < 2 >] \Rightarrow P$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Composition

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow R \qquad \vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : R \Rightarrow S$$

 $\vdash c_1; c_1' \sim c_2; c_2' : P \Rightarrow S$

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic Consequence

$$P \Rightarrow S \qquad \vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : S \Rightarrow R \qquad R \Rightarrow Q$$

$$\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$$

We can weaken P, i.e. replace it by something that is implied by P. In this case S.

We can strengthen Q, i.e. replace it by something that implies Q. In this case R.

Rules of Hoare Logic If then else

 $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e_1 < 1 > \land e_2 < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : \neg e_1 < 1 > \land \neg e_2 < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1' $\vdash \qquad \sim \qquad : P \Rightarrow Q$ if e_2 then c_2 else c_2'

Rules of Hoare Logic If then else

 $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e_1 < 1 > \land e_2 < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : \neg e_1 < 1 > \land \neg e_2 < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1' $\vdash \qquad \sim \qquad : P \Rightarrow Q$ if e_2 then c_2 else c_2'

Is this correct?

Is this a valid quadruple?

if true then skip else x:=x+1 $\{x=n\} \Rightarrow \{x=n+1\}$ \sim if false then x:=x+1 else skip

Is this a valid quadruple?



if true then skip else x:=x+1
- ~ :{x=n}⇒{x=n+1}
if false then x:=x+1 else skip

Is this a valid quadruple?



Can we prove it with the rule above?

if true then skip else x:=x+1
- ~ :{x=n}⇒{x=n+1}
if false then x:=x+1 else skip

Is this a valid quadruple?



Can we prove it with the rule above?

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If then else

 $P \Rightarrow e_1 < 1 > = e_2 < 2 >$ $\vdash_{C_1 \sim C_2} : e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow O$ $\vdash c_1 \prime \sim c_2 \prime : \neg e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow O$ if e_1 then c_1 else c_1' :P⇒O if e_2 then c_2 else c_2'

Rules of Hoare Logic While $P \Rightarrow e_1 < 1 > = e_2 < 2 >$ $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2$: $e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow P$ while e_1 do c_1 : $P \Rightarrow P \land \neg e_1 < 1 >$ while e_2 do c_2 Invariant



x:private
y:public

y:=x
$$: =_{low} \Rightarrow \neg (=_{low})$$

x:private
y:public

y:=x
$$: =_{low} \Rightarrow \neg (=_{low})$$

Can we prove it?









Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If then else

 $P \Rightarrow e_1 < 1 >= e_2 < 2 >$ $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$ $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2' : \neg e_1 < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow Q$

if e_1 then c_1 else c_1'' $\vdash \qquad \sim \qquad : P \Rightarrow Q$ if e_2 then c_2 else c_2''

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If then else - left

 $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2 : e < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow O$ $\vdash c_1' \sim c_2: \neg e < 1 > \land P \Rightarrow O$

if e then c₁ else c₁' - ~ :P⇒Q C2

Rules of Relational Hoare Logic If then else - left

 $\vdash_{C_1 \sim C_2} : e < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow O$ $\vdash c_1 \sim c_2' : \neg e < 2 > \land P \Rightarrow O$

 $\vdash c_1 \\ \sim : P \Rightarrow Q$ if e then c_2 else c_2'



x:public
z:public
y:private

y:=0
z:=0
if x=0 then z:=1;
if z=0 then y:=1

:
$$=_{low} \Rightarrow =_{low}$$

x:private
z:public
y:private

y:=0
z:=0
if x=0 then z:=1;
if z=0 then y:=1

: =
$$_{low} \Rightarrow \neg (=_{low})$$

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while i < n / r = 0 do
 if not(s1[i]=s2[i]) then
    r:=1
 i:=i+1
: n > 0 / = low \Rightarrow \neg (=low)
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How can we prove this?

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